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Stock price reactions to wire news from the European Central Bank:
evidence from changes in the sentiment tone and international
market indexes
Abstract
This paper examines the link between changes in the sentiment tone with respect to
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) announcements and stock returns. The analysis
constructs a new index that describes the tone of the sentiment derived from these
announcements, spanning the period January 2002 to June 2016. The novelty of this
work  relies  on  the  development  of  a  unique  sentiment  index  associated  with  the
messages conveyed by the ECB’s activities and the effect of this index on both the
mean and the volatility of certain major international stock markets. In this context,
the  sentiment  index  is  present  in  both  the  conditional  mean  and  the  volatility
equations.  The  findings  indicate  a  significant  impact  on  both  the  mean  and  the
volatility of returns, whereas the news sentiment/stock returns association increases in
strength during the crisis period. The findings survive a robustness check based on the
characteristics of the ECB governor’s personality. 
Keywords: changes in the tone of sentiment wire news; ECB announcements; stock
prices; international stock markets
JEL Numbers: G01; E58
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1. Introduction
Public  news provides  early warnings  of the current  situation  of  the stock market,
whereas  media  reports  influence  the  beliefs  of  market  participants  and  induce
investors either to enter or to withdraw their funds from investment instruments. The
ability to exploit such public information comes with the growth of big data, which
crunches  data  sets  so  large  that  they  cannot  be  speedily  analysed  by  traditional
database  software  tools.  Analytics  is  emerging  with  innovative  software  products
purposely  designed  for  large  amounts  of  data  in  all  forms,  including  textual
information, numbers and images. In fact, sentiment analysis of natural language texts
is  a  large  and  growing field,  especially  for  financial  economists.  This  allows  the
human brain to discover hidden correlations in a more rapid way and, therefore, to
extract a hypothesis from an incomplete data set using intuition and logical deduction.
In addition, differences of opinion seem to be a source of agent heterogeneity, while
they may facilitate trading in financial  markets. The release of public information,
which  has  important  implications  for  asset  prices,  could  substantially  widen  the
disparity of opinion and offer an information processing advantage to some traders,
perhaps leading to  information  asymmetries  and affecting  the provision of  market
liquidity, damaging market functionality, and harming the news transmission process.
Mullainathan and Spiess (2017) argue that  machine learning is  a new quantitative
approach that can discover complex structures and fits very functional forms that can
be used  to  generate  superior  predictions,  especially  in  the  field  of  finance,  while
Moritz and Zimmermann (2016) make use of machine learning-generated information
to highlight  that  past  stock returns  from US firms can have substantial  predictive
power over their future stock returns.
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With respect to monetary policy, central bankers place great importance on the
transparency  and  predictability  of  their  activities  and,  consequently,  on  their
associated  impact  on  financial  markets.  Blinder  et  al.  (2008)  argue  that
communication  helps  central  banks  achieve  their  objectives  and that  it  can  move
markets. Fawley and Neely (2014) report that the Fed has modified its procedures
over time to become more transparent. By contrast, Wynne (2013) argues that policy
statements  may unsettle  financial  markets  if  they are too difficult  to  comprehend,
whereas Bulíř et al. (2013) highlight that the clarity of central bank communication
varies throughout the business cycle. The lengthier statements that have accompanied
policy announcements in the modern era of unconventional monetary policy are more
difficult to understand (Hernandez-Murrillo and Shell, 2014), which leads to higher
market volatility  (Jansen, 2011) and makes it more difficult  for central  bankers to
gauge the impact of their policy decisions. 
The goal of this paper is to consider, for the first time, the association between
changes in the tone of the sentiment of news originating from the European Central
Bank’s (ECB) activities and the mean and the volatility of stock returns relevant to
major global stock markets. The following key question is explored: how are stock
returns influenced by these changes in the sentiment tone associated with monetary
authorities’  activities?  Understanding  how  stock  markets  respond  to  changes
regarding  sentiment  tone  news  significant  to  monetary  policy  is  expected  to  aid
market  participants  in  determining  improved  investment/portfolio  choices.  The
literature has not focused on how the information coming from textual  analysis  is
relevant to central banks or whether it has any informational content for stock returns.
Only a handful of empirical research attempts have explored the impact of central
banks’  announcement  news  on  stock  markets.  Particularly,  D’Amico  and  Farka
5
(2001) provide evidence in favour of the impact of monetary policy on movements of
asset prices, with a tightening of interest rates driven by monetary policy having a
negative effect on stock prices. Moreover, Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) highlight
the  importance  of  the  Fed’s  announcement  news for  market  participants,  whereas
Hoeberichts et al. (2009) support that ambiguous messages from central banks have
only  temporary  effects  on  the  increasing  volatility  of  certain  economic  variables.
Schmidt and Nautz (2012) claim that financial market participants have systematically
misunderstood the ECB’s monetary policy, which is related to the adopted interest
rate rule, whereas the understanding of the monetary policy that pertains to inflation
has  become  more  accurate.  Finally,  Kurihara  (2014)  explores  the  role  of  ECB’s
announcements  on  European  stock  markets  and  finds  there  is  an  absence  of  any
statistically significant effect on stock prices. Furthermore, given that the release of a
monetary policy decision conveys information to stock markets (Funke and Matsuda,
2006),  the  Eurozone  financial  markets  should  react  to  ECB  monetary  policy
announcements. However, the ECB also seeks credibility as part of its strategy, while
financial markets aim to understand any signals about the directions of interest rate
developments.  The  Eurozone  financial  markets  extract  information  from the  ECB
announcements  and,  therefore,  consider  the  information  in  subsequent  investment
decisions to evaluate empirically whether market participants learn how to evaluate
ECB’s  monetary  policy,  as  it  seems  to  be  highly  important  to  learn  from  such
announcements, not only with respect to the European but also the global financial
markets. This learning process can be substantially enhanced by decoding the words
and phrases coming from the textual analysis of those announcements, thus offering
improved explanations of monetary policy decisions that are expected to enhance the
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quality of communications between monetary policy decisions and financial markets
and defining better transmission channels for the effectiveness of the monetary policy.
The novelty  of  this  work relies  on the development  of  a  unique sentiment
index associated with the messages conveyed by the ECB’s activities and the effect of
this index on both the mean and the volatility of certain stock markets. In this context,
the  sentiment  index  is  present  in  both  the  conditional  mean  and  the  volatility
equations.  To  foreshadow  the  key  findings,  the  analysis  documents  that  the
constructed  sentiment  index  associated  with  ECB  activities  exerts  a  strong  and
statistically significant effect on both the mean and the volatility of important stock
market indexes. Such findings add to the discussion on whether stock returns correctly
incorporate (monetary policy) news sentiments into their own pricing processes. 
2. Related literature
This paper is relevant to four fundamental strands of the literature. First, it touches the
literature that explores the role of news in predicting stock prices. Given that investors
are not fully rational, their investment behaviours are influenced by various market
news, which consequently influence stock prices. Web sites, e.g., Google Finance and
Yahoo Finance, and newspapers, e.g., the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal,
are two typical types of sources that provide financial news. As these news sources
provide a great number of news articles daily, investors are not able to manage all
updates.  To separate  useless  news,  which reduces  noise signals,  and useful  news,
which  retrieves  market  signals,  substantial  human  efforts  are  required.  With  the
advancement of financial methodologies and computer technologies, those previously
required  human  efforts  have  been  replaced  by  computers  that  can  manage  the
abundance of financial news. Although the efficient market hypothesis assumes that
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the market  is  efficient  and can  absorb the  news impact  quickly,  researchers  from
behavioural finance challenge that market participants are not fully rational and there
are  many  cases  indicating  that  investors’  irrational  behaviours  will  likely  lead  to
mispricing,  a  situation  that  requires  substantial  time  for  the  market  to  correct
(Andersen et al., 2007; Savor and Wilson, 2013; Kurov et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2017).
By  contrast,  in  the  case  of  the  ECB  announcements,  Kurihara  (2014)  examines
whether and how ECB communications influence stock returns in the Euro area. His
results emphasize that the impact of such announcements on stock returns has not
been significant. 
The second strand relates to the literature that focuses on providing evidence
of  the  effect  of  textual  information  processing  on  asset  prices  through  machine
learning algorithms (Baker et al., 2012). Tetlock’s pioneering studies (Tetlock, 2007;
Tetlock  et  al.,  2008)  illustrate  that  news  stories  contain  information  relevant  to
predicting both earnings and stock returns. Subsequent studies have applied similar
techniques based on a variety of news sources (Groß-Klußman and Hautsch, 2011;
Dougal et al., 2012; Ro, 2012; Boudoukh et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Sinha, 2016).
However, the main disadvantage of the above attempts is that they are limited to a
comparatively narrow event  window and have not  shown significant  predictability
beyond two days after a news release. Beetsma et al. (2013) employ Eurointelligence,
which contains major newspaper articles pertaining to economic news across Europe.
Their study highlights that increases in the amount of news intensifies the sovereign
bond spreads in the peripheral countries. Gidofalvi (2001) obtains over 5,000 financial
news  articles  concerning  twelve  specific  stocks  and identifies  a  20-minute  period
before and 20-minute period after  a financial  news article  is  released.  Within this
period of time, he demonstrates that there exists weak ability to predict the direction
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of stock returns before the market corrects itself to equilibrium. Huang et al. (2005)
use support vector machines to predict weekly movements of the Japanese NIKKEI
225 index. Their approach achieved 73% using a combined modelling strategy. Lutz
(2010)  accepts  the  impact  of  three  different  sentiment  measures  on  the  future
performance of stock returns, i.e., the Baker and Wurgler’s Sentiment Index (Baker
and Wurgler, 2006, 2007), the smoothed earnings-price ratio, and the VIX (volatility)
index. His findings illustrate  that  such sentiment  measures have very little  out-of-
sample predictive power. Barone-Adesi et al. (2012) is one of the very few studies
that investigates  the role of sentiment during the August 2007 crisis.  Their  results
provide evidence that sentiment decreased dramatically as the systemic risk escalated
during that period. Bai (2014) differentiates investor sentiment only confined within
the  market  from sentiment  across  international  markets.  Particularly,  he  explores
different  aspects  of  investor  sentiment  impact  by  differentiating  the  scope  of  the
influence of the sentiment.  His results document that developed and emerging EU
stock market regional sentiments have a significant impact on market excess returns
and volatility. Moreover, his findings provide evidence that regional sentiments are
transmitted across borders via specific transmission mechanisms, such as interbank
lending  networks.  As  a  result,  sentiments  are  contagious  according  to  the  strong
evidence of causality across sentiment indexes. 
The  third  strand  of  the  literature  is  associated  with  how sentiment  affects
financial  markets.  This  literature  investigates  the  role  of  professional  news  on
electronic social media (Tetlock, 2007; Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012; Karabulut, 2013)
in predicting stock returns, whereas Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Jegadeesh
and Wu (2013) find more rapid responses for individual stocks within a multi-day
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event  window and Hillert  et  al.  (2014) suggest  that  media  overreaction  motivates
stock momentum. 
Finally, the fourth strand of the literature is associated with the textual analysis
of the information  content  of  central  banks’  communications  (Bholat  et  al.,  2015,
review many applications of text mining techniques relevant to central banks). Hansen
and McMahon (2016) find that FOMC communications regarding current economic
conditions and shocks to forward guidance have no strong effects on real economic
variables. These studies make use of dictionary-based methods to quantify the content
of  central  banks’  announcements.  The  dictionary  used  is  a  context-specific  list
developed by Apel and Grimaldi (2012), especially designed to measure the tone of
central bank communications by making use of combinations of words. We contribute
to  this  literature  by  developing  a  more  detailed  word  list  that  allows  for  word
combinations,  as  in  Apel  and Grimaldi  (2012).  More  details  regarding our  newly
developed word list are presented both in the data section and in Appendices 2 and 3.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
To investigate the effect of textual news with respect to announcements coming from
the ECB on stock markets, we employ intraday (London, Frankfurt, Paris markets)
and opening (NY and Tokyo markets)  price  data  from a number of stock market
indexes, spanning the period January 1, 2002 to June 30, 2016. The analysis reports
the  results  of  the  major  international  stock  price  indexes,  i.e.,  S&P500,  FTS100,
CAC40, DAX, and Nikkei225. Returns (rt) are calculated as the logged differences of
stock prices, rt =  ln Pt – ln Pt-1, with P standing from the price of the market index.
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Intraday data  are  obtained  from the  Thomson Reuters  Tick  History database,  and
current and opening price data are obtained from the Datastream database.
The employed dataset has a measure of the ‘tone’ or sentiment of each news
story.  The story-specific  sentiment  measure  allows  us  to  distinguish  the  effect  of
favourable  vs  unfavourable  news.  The  information  conveyed  in  the  ECB’s
announcements may draw attention to stock returns, thereby inducing both rational
and  irrational  trading,  which  may  affect  the  liquidity  of  the  stock  market  and,
consequently, impact change stock returns. With respect to the empirical analysis, this
study collects all ECB announcements around the main refinancing operations (MRO)
during the ECB Council  of Governors  meetings  from January 2002 to June 2016
using the event dates listed on the ECB website. The sample covers 167 statements,
and the dates associated with the ECB statements are provided in the Appendix.
The  analysis  focuses  on  the  MRO  since  it  is  the  main  instrument  under
control, whereas a monetary policy announcement is defined as the release of this rate
by  the  governing  council  of  the  ECB.  More  specifically,  the  ECB  governor’s
introductory statements at the press conference of the governing council are used for
our content analysis, i.e., 4,788 different words are used in all introductory statements
over the relevant period). We do not rely on raw word counts because, in many cases,
this can be misleading. We, therefore, make use of a combination of words, a concept
word and a tone modifier word. To develop the exhaustive central bank phrase list, we
select concept words closely related to the state of the economy, with the selection of
the  words  based  exclusively  on  economic  theory.  More  specifically,  states  of  the
economy-related  word examples  include  words  such as  economic,  unemployment,
demand, income, and prices. We then programmatically extract from the text corpus
all  phrases  that  include  at  least  one  of  these  words.  Examples  include  economic
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activity, the unemployment rate, aggregate demand, domestic demand, and disposable
income.  By  carefully  examining  all  related  phrases,  we  explicitly  consider  any
inflections or different forms of the words of interest. Examples are wage and wages,
inflationary pressure and inflationary pressures, and prices and inflation.
We then assign to each word, as well as to its similar terms, a tone modifier.
The tone modifier can be either positive or negative. In doing so, we use collocation
and identify the adjectives, adverbs or verbs that surround these words. As above, we
again  consider  any  inflections  or  different  forms  of  the  words  of  interest,  i.e.,
decelerate, decelerates, decelerating, decelerated. For the tone modifier list to be as
exhaustive as possible, the methodology uses the relevant word lists from WordNet.
In other words, it extracts from our corpus all tokens that were included in the lists of
verbs,  adverbs  and  adjectives  on  WordNet.  It  then  automatically  identifies  each
extracted  token  to  be  positive  or  negative.  After  removing  stop  words  from our
corpus, we search for a tone modifier in a span of four words before or ahead of our
concept phrase/word, selecting the tone modifier that is closest to the concept phrase/
word.  The  tone  modifiers  identify,  in  each  case,  whether  the  tone  is  positive  or
negative as it relates to the state of the economy. For instance, decreasing economic
activity  describes  a  downturn  in  the  state  of  the  economy,  whereas  an expanding
production typically describes an upturn in the state of the economy. 
Our newly created phrase list  contains  112 concept  phrases/words and 316
tone modifiers. The word list of Apel and Grimaldi (2012) (AG list, hereafter), which
is the only one related to central banks’ communications, contains 11 concepts and ten
tone modifiers; as eight out of ten used tone modifiers are denoted as wild cards, the
actual number of tone modifiers is greater than ten. The concepts used are inflation,
price,  wage,  oil  price,  cyclical  position,  growth,  development,  employment,
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unemployment, recovery and cost. The main difference between our list and that of
Apel and Grimaldi (2012) is that we use, for the most part, a combination of words as
key concepts, rather than just nouns. Examples include the word growth, in which
case we use the phrases global growth, productivity growth, growth outlook, growth
prospects, income growth, and output growth. Our phrase list also contains phrases
based on words that are not included in the AG list,  i.e., demand, output, income,
consumption,  credit,  and  loans.  These  words  are  determinants  in  describing  the
economic  environment.  We do  not  include  the  phrase  cyclical  position,  which  is
included on the AG list, as it is not used in the vocabulary of the ECB and, instead, we
use the phrase cyclical recovery. As a final remark regarding the AG list, we note that
the separate inclusion of the word price and oil price may lead to the over or under
estimation of the communication index as the token price is counted twice.
Moreover, there are substantial differences between our tone modifier list and
the  AG  list.  More  specifically,  the  AG  list  contains  only  a  limited  number  of
adjectives,  i.e.,  high,  strong,  increasing,  increase,  fast,  low,  weak,  decreasing,
decrease and slow, whereas our list contains the aforementioned words, plus many
others.  For  example,  our  list  includes  foster,  improve,  reduce,  decelerate,  boost,
elevate, and enhance. The inclusion of the new tone modifier words contributes to a
more  accurate  quantification  of  the  tone  of  the  ECB’s  announcements.  We
automatically search for these word combinations and then insert their occurrences in
a  matrix  for  each  of  the  announcements.  Each  row  in  the  matrix  represents  an
announcement,  and each column represents the number of total  occurrences of the
word combinations that contribute to a positive or a negative tone. Following Apel
and Grimaldi (2012), we determine the net effect of the announcements by calculating
the following net sentiment index:
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Net Sentiment Index=[((#positive comb.) / (#positive comb.+#negative comb.))-
((#negative comb.)/(#positive comb.+#negative comb))]
where  #positive  comb and  #negative  comb denote  the  number  of  occurrences  of
positive  and  negative  word  combinations,  respectively.  The  index  applies  values
between  0  and 2,  with  2  indicating  a  strong positive  evaluation  of  the  economic
situation in the Eurozone and 0 indicating a strong negative evaluation. In addition,
we calculate a sentiment index as:
Sentiment index=(#positive words-#negative words)/(#words)
where  #positive  and #negative  words  denote  the number  of  positive  and negative
words  in  each announcement,  respectively,  and #words  denotes  the number of all
words  in  the  text.  The  number  of  positive  and  negative  words  is  calculated  by
counting the number of words  in  each combination.  For example,  global  demand
increases counts as three positive words. The denominator,  #words, represents the
total  number of words in each announcement.  The sentiment index assumes either
positive or negative values. A positive value denotes that the Eurozone expands, and a
negative value denotes a pessimistic economic outlook. Sentiment and net sentiment
indexes are highly correlated (0.92). A detailed example of the construction of the
index is offered in the Appendix, and the detailed lists of the combinations of words
that  denote  positive  and  negative  outlooks  for  the  economy  are  presented  in  the
Appendix. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for both sentiment indexes and for
the corresponding ECB announcements of time stock index prices. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]
3.2. Methodology
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The analysis makes use of the mean-variance modelling approach, i.e., the EGARCH-
X  methodology  (Hansen  and  Lunde,  2011),  which  retains  the  properties  of  the
EGARCH  model  recommended  by  Nelson  (1991)  in  capturing  asymmetries  in
volatility clustering and the leverage effect observed across asset markets, while also
extending the model to include any other factors in the X vector of control variables.
                         T
rt = α0 + β ΔSENTt-1 + Σbi rt-i  + δ DUM2008 + εt (1)
             i=1
ht = ω + α εt-1 + γ (|εt-1| - E|εt-1|) + θ ht-1 + φ ΔSENTt-1 (2)
where  Δ denotes first differences,  rit proxies stock returns, and SENTt-1 proxies the
evaluation of sentiment news in accordance with the ECB’s monetary policy activities
(later defined as the baseline sentiment index-SI and the net sentiment index-NSI). It
comes with a lag since it precedes the stock price reaction. A dummy variable is also
included  that  explicitly  captures  the  role  of  the  2008  crisis  on  returns  (Blajer-
Gołębiewska, 2012). The dummy variable takes the value of zero from January 2002
to July 2007 and from January 2010 to June 2016, and it takes the value of one from
August  2007  to  December  2009.  The  mean  equation  (1)  is  well  described  as  an
autoregressive-X  (AR-X)  model,  i.e.,  an  AR  model  augmented  by  any  control
variables Xt. The conditional volatility equation (2) describes a type of EGARCH-X
modelling  approach.  In  both equations,  the sentiment  index is  allowed to play an
explicit role in influencing both the mean and the volatility of stock returns. 
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Unit root tests
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The variables in the mean equation should be stationary. To this end, the DF-GLS unit
root  test,  proposed  by  Elliott  et  al.  (1996),  has  been  considered.  The  Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) selects the appropriate lag length to remove any serial
correlation in the residuals. The DF-GLS test detrends the data to maximize power,
and its null hypothesis is the non-stationarity of the series under investigation. The
results, reported in Table 2, indicate that all variables considered are integrated of
order one.  
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4.2. Baseline estimates
In the next step of the analysis, Table 3 reports the formal estimates of equations (1)
and (2) in which changes in the sentiment index simultaneously affect stock returns
and their associated (conditional) volatility. It is further noted that on the day of a
Governing Council meeting, the ECB announces its decision on interest rates with a
press  release  at  13:45  (CET).  As  the  Tokyo  market  is  closed  at  the  time  of  this
conference,  any  effect  is  not  observed  until  the  opening  price  of  the  next  day.
However, with respect to the Frankfurt and Paris stock markets, the 13:49 index price
is  used  (after  having determined  that  over  the  first  four  minutes,  the  impact  was
statistically insignificant but that in the fifth minute statistically significant results are
observed). Additionally, for the London market, the 12:49 (local London time) stock
index price is made available (the same explanation as above regarding statistically
significant results). Finally, for the NY market we also use opening index prices.  
The findings well document the statistical significance of the fact that changes
in the sentiment index have a positive effect on stock returns and a negative effect on
the associated (conditional) volatility, with both effects being statistically significant
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at 1%. The findings also indicate that there exists a strong persistence in stock returns,
while  the crisis  dummy exerts  a  negative  effect  on those returns.  In  addition,  the
gamma  coefficient,  i.e.,  the  indicator  for  asymmetric  volatility,  is  negative  and
statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the estimates suggest that the
coefficient  for  the asymmetric  volatility  is  negative,  i.e.,  negative  shocks imply  a
higher next period conditional variance than positive shocks of the same sign. The
results remain robust with respect to the case of the net sentiment index as well (Table
4), albeit they are of lower size. These findings illustrate the need for studying in a
future research venue the potential asymmetries of reaction.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
4.3. Robustness check: the role of the Governor of the ECB
This part of the empirical analysis investigates how the idiosyncratic characteristics of
the  ECB’s  governors  have  influenced  the  way  monetary  policy  decision-making
throughout the study period has impacted stock returns. Blinder (2009) discusses the
specific features of the people who make monetary policy decisions, while Harris et
al.  (2011)  investigate  whether  the  characteristics  of  the  members  of  the  Bank  of
England’s Monetary Policy Committee can affect the decision to dissent from the
majority decision and whether differences in career backgrounds impact the manner in
which  the  monetary  policy  manages  inflation  and unemployment.  Their  empirical
results  suggest  that  the  institutional  constraints  associated  with  the  UK monetary
policy, rather than the career background and other characteristics of the members, is
what  influences  voting  behaviours.  Similarly,  Smales  (2013)  suggests  that  the
decision-making  behaviour  of  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Australia  is  related  to  the
inflation-targeting framework within which the bank operates.  
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A separate part  of this literature focuses on the strategic and psychological
factors affecting the behaviour of monetary policy committee members. Rülke and
Tillmann (2011) study the extent of herding behaviour in FOMC member forecasts
regarding  growth,  inflation  and  unemployment  and  find  no  evidence  of  herding
behaviour.  These findings support the view that  forecasts  signal FOMC members’
policy preferences. Claussen et al. (2012) emphasize the role of psychological factors,
such as overconfidence,  in monetary policy making. These are the factors used to
explain disagreements among committee members, the provision of decision power to
those members, and the fact that the governors of monetary policy committees rarely
find  themselves  on  the  losing  side  of  the  committee  vote.  Finally,  Weise  (2012)
suggests that political considerations contributed to delays in tackling the rise in U.S.
inflation in the 1970s.
The  sample  period  covers  the  tenures  of  Wim  Duisenberg  (2001  to
10/31/2003),  Jean-Claude  Trichet  (11/1/2003  to  10/31/2011),  and  Mario  Draghi
(11/1/2011 to present)  as  governors  of  the  ECB.  This  time frame is  of  particular
importance considering the changing dynamics of the European economy, which has
evolved through states of high inflation, low growth at the start of the Duisenberg era,
high growth during the Trichet era, and the sovereign debt crisis and unconventional
monetary  policy  during  both  the  Trichet  and  Draghi  eras.  The  new  results  are
expected to be of significant importance to a variety of economic agents. A greater
understanding  of  the  potential  role  of  the  governor’s  characteristics  may  allow
economic  agents  to  revise  their  expectations  more  efficiently  and  rebalance  their
portfolios appropriately. In addition, economic agents can anticipate the future nature
of the monetary  policy,  which has implications  for long-term output and inflation
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performance, through improved forecasting of interest rates and asset prices that could
lead to the reduction in the volatility of asset prices.
With  respect  to  the  empirical  analysis,  the  first  period  contains  21
announcement  events,  the  second  period  has  93  such  events,  and  the  last  period
includes 53 announcement events. The new empirical findings, reported in Tables 5
and 6, illustrate that both sentiment indexes exert a positive impact on the means and
a negative  impact  on  the  volatility  of  returns  across  all  three  governor  eras.  The
insignificance of the effect during the Duisenberg era could be potentially attributed
to the low number of observations or to the fact that it coincides with the first period
of the Eurozone,  a period when the role of the ECB had not been fully assessed.
However, the impact of both sentiment indexes on stock returns during the Trichet era
is  either  very  low  or  statistically  insignificant  (especially  in  the  non-European
markets), while turns strong during the Draghi era. Regarding the remaining control
variables, the decomposed results lend consistent support to the estimates across all
three periods and are relevant to the overall results previously reported.
Focusing on the Trichet and Draghi eras, several conclusions are drawn. First,
both governors were asked to manage the efficiency of the monetary policy in the
Eurozone in light of the debt sovereign crisis period that followed the 2007 to 2009
international  financial  crisis.  The  significance  of  this  role  seems  to  link  with
Friedman's  (1962)  hypothesis  that  accidents  of  personality  can  have  substantial
consequences for rule-based institutions.  However, Blinder (2009) favours the fact
that  central  banks  should  be  independent,  rule-based  institutions  focused  on  the
maintenance of price stability, while signifying the disappearance of strong, leading
personalities.  Siklos (2002) investigates how the personalities of Paul Volcker and
Alan  Greenspan  influenced  the  monetary  policy  of  the  Fed,  and  Lebaron  (2008)
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develops an analytical framework or sociology of central bankers to assess how the
personality  characteristics  of  leading  central  bankers  influence  a  central  bank’s
behaviour. This line of research accepts the possibility of varying strategies regarding
monetary policies, even if all central bankers share neo-liberal economic beliefs.  
Nevertheless, despite the constraints posed by the treaty, the governors of the
ECB  are  allowed  significant  room  to  manoeuvre.  Accordingly,  consistent  with
personality theories, we can accept the possibility of different policy makers choosing
different monetary policy strategies. Thus, the empirical findings presented in Tables
5  and  6  document  that  there  have  been  some differentiations  in  policy  decisions
between Trichet and Draghi. The reason for such differentiations in policy decisions is
founded upon the different personal developments of these two decision makers. For
instance, Trichet was fundamentally more constrained by the institutional framework
and, therefore, less flexible than Draghi. Institutionally, although both governors were
equally  constrained  legally,  Trichet’s  deep involvement  in  the  institution  building
process prevented any significant departure in policymaking. In contrast, Draghi, who
was not institutionally bound to the ECB and whose personal development was that of
an  outsider,  initiates  changes  and  has  adopted  a  flexible  interpretation  of  the
institutional  mandate.  For  instance,  Trichet  and  Draghi  differed  regarding  non-
standard  policy  measures  as  well  as  the  use  of  long-term  refinancing  operations
(LTROs) and the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Although both Trichet and
Draghi made use of LTROs, Trichet increased the maturity from three months to one
year, whereas Draghi increased it to three years. Furthermore, Draghi decided on two
large-scale refinancing operations that amounted to €1 trillion in December 2011 and
February 2012, which contrasted with Trichet’s hesitant use of refinancing operations
(Fawley  and  Neely,  2014).  Similarly,  although  both  governors  sought  to  restore
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monetary policy transmissions through the SMP, Draghi progressively reduced the
use of the SMP and eventually announced its replacement with Outright Monetary
Transactions  (OMTs).  The  effectiveness  of  OMTs  was  made  credible  because  of
Draghi’s previous decision regarding interest rates and liquidity provisions (Bibow,
2013).
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
4.4. Robustness check: the role of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis
During the financial crisis that struck the global financial system between 2007 and
2009,  many  central  banks  aggressively  eased  the  monetary  policy  to  alleviate
financial market distress, boost output and stabilize inflation. Overall, the monetary
policy  was  largely  successful  in  mitigating  financial  market  distress,  but  output
growth  remained  lower  than  expected  in  many  advanced  economies  (Pain  et  al.,
2014). 
The  financial  crisis  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  financial  market
distress,  substantial  balance-sheet  adjustments  of  financial  institutions,  private
households and firms, and a high degree of uncertainty and low confidence of firms,
consumers and market participants (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Bloom, 2009; Dées
and Brinca, 2013). These characteristics may potentially impair the transmission of
the monetary policy (Bouis et  al.,  2013; Bloom, 2014). It is also possible that the
effects of the monetary policy could be amplified during financial  crises if central
banks can mitigate some of the adverse characteristics of financial crises and prevent
adverse feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy (Bernanke
et al., 1999; Mishkin, 2009). Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the financial
crisis disrupted not only the regular transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy
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but that it also called into question whether the monetary policy could effectively steer
short-term money market rates in such an environment (Eisenschmidt and Tapking,
2009; Taylor and Williams, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009; Schwarz, 2010; Christensen et al., 2014), which in return may have a strong
impact on the prices of financial assets and, thus, on the real economy. 
Given the above discussion, this part of the empirical analysis explores the impact
of  the  financial  crisis  on  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy
announcements by re-estimating the impact of both sentiment indexes on both the mean
and the volatility of international stock index returns only during the crisis period. This
period  extends  from  August  2007  to  December  2009  and  consists  of  30  ECB
announcement statements. The new results, which are reported in Tables 7 and 8, provide
strong support that changes in both sentiment indexes exert a negative effect on stock
returns and a positive impact on volatility, clearly indicating the dominance of contraction
effects. 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here]
5. Conclusion
This paper explored the relationship between changes in the tone of sentiment news
originating from ECB’s activities and stock returns. Using data from the major global
stock market indexes and new sentiment news indexes and spanning the period from
January 1, 2002 to June 30, 2016, the empirical evidence suggested that such changes
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in the tone of sentiment news stories were substantially important for both the mean
and the volatility of stock returns. More specifically, the impact on the mean of stock
returns was found to be positive, whereas that on the volatility of those returns was
negative.  The  results  remained  robust  across  all  stock  markets  considered  in  this
study, and they survived a robustness check with respect to the personality of the ECB
governors. In this latter case, the findings were differentiated with respect to the era
when governor Draghi assumed the position of the ECB governor. Finally, the role of
the  changes  in  sentiment  news  received  stronger  empirical  support  for  estimates
during the financial crisis period. 
Based on these findings, we propose that market participants could use the
information obtained from such sentiment news to interpret ECB’s future activities
and to design effective investment/portfolio strategies. Our results are important for
policymakers, as they contribute to the understanding of the transmission mechanism
of the monetary policy. Central bankers should be aware that because their statements
may create unintentional uncertainty in financial markets, they should use language
that is relatively easy to understand to ensure that the intent of policy is appropriately
conveyed.  Particularly,  central  bankers  may  be  able  to  reduce  the  announcement
effect on uncertainty by increasing guidance in advance, thus reducing the surprise
factor,  and  by  issuing  statements  with  more  familiar  words  and  less  complex
reasoning. Future research could also explore the above underpinnings with respect to
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
_____________________________________________________________________
Variables Mean SD Min Max          Jarque-Bera
_____________________________________________________________________
SI 0.035         0.030 -0.045 0.116       3.16
NSI 1.321         0.274  0.642 1.935       4.07
S&P500 0.337         0.898            -0.933 0.337   809.52
CAC40 0.958         1.928  0.958 3.684   748.10
FTSE100 1.701         1.785            -0.824 1.701 1003.27
DAX 1.592         0.007  1.583 1.592   977.19
NIKKEI 0.704         0.913  0.704 1.996   866.53
_____________________________________________________________________
The table provides a number of descriptive statistics. SI is the sentiment index and NSI is the net
sentiment index. With respect  to the stock indexes,  the statistics refers to returns.  The Jarque-Bera
statistic is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom; its critical value at the
5% significance level is 5.99. Data are obtained from Thomson Reuters History Tick and Thomson
Reuters Datastream databases.
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Table 2. Unit root testing: the DF-GLS test
_____________________________________________________________________
     Country        US          France   UK       Germany        Japan     
Variables
_____________________________________________________________________
stock prices -1.28(3)     -1.25(3)     -1.28(3)       -1.35(3)     -1.37(4)    







The  table  reports  the  unit  root  test  results  based  on  the  DF-GLS testing  method.  SI  denotes  the
sentiment index, while NSI the net sentiment index. Returns variables are in logarithms.  Δ indicates
first differences. Numbers in parentheses denote the optimal number of lags used in the augmentation
of the test regression and were obtained through the Akaike criterion. ***: p≤0.01. Data are obtained
from Thomson Reuters History Tick and Thomson Reuters Datastream databases.
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Table 3. EGARCH-X estimates: Sentiment Index (baseline results)
Variables/ S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKKEI


















































































































































No. of obs.  167 167 167 167 167
The table reports the baseline estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the SI index. LL
denotes the log likelihood. Figures in brackets denote p-values. (1) indicates the estimates in relevance
to Equation (1) in the EGARCH-X model and (2) indicates the estimates in relevance to Equation (2).
a: p≤0.01, b:p≤0.05.
Table 4. EGARCH-X estimates: Net Sentiment Index (baseline results)
Variables/ S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKKEI






















































































































































No. of obs.  167 167 167 167 167
This table reports the baseline estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the NSI index. LL
denotes the log likelihood. Figures in brackets denote p-values. (1) indicates the estimates in relevance
to Equation (1) in the EGARCH-X model and (2) indicates the estimates in relevance to Equation (2) in
the EGARCH-X model. a: p≤0.01, b:p≤0.05.
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Table 5. EGARCH-X estimates: Sentiment Index (the role of the ECB governor)-equations (1) and (2)
Variables
The Duisenberg Era The Trichet Era The Draghi Era




















































































































































Obs  21 21 21 21 21 93 93 93 93 93 53 53 53 53 53
Table 5. Continued 
Variables The Duisenberg Era The Trichet Era The Draghi Era
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S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKEI S&P500 CAC40 FTSE10
0




























































































































































LL 2348.4 2864.1 3052.7 3082.6 2733.9 2492.5 2945.6 3236.5 3211.3 2805.6 2171.9 2533.6 3075.6 3019.5 2536.1
No. of obs 21 21 21 21 21 93 93 93 93 93 53 53 53 53 53
This table reports the estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the SI index per ECB governors’ eras. LL stands for log likelihood. Figures in 
brackets denote p-values. a: p≤0.01, b:p≤0.05, c:p≤0.10.
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Table 6. EGARCH-X estimates: Net Sentiment Index (the role of the ECB governor)-equations (1) and (2)
Variables
The Duisenberg Era The Trichet Era The Draghi Era
S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKEI S&P500 CAC40 FTSE10
0





























































































































































No. of obs  21 21 21 21 21 93 93 93 93 93 53 53 53 53 53
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Table 6. Continued 
Variables
The Duisenberg Era The Trichet Era The Draghi Era




























































































































































LL 2286.0 2652.4 2928.5 2926.2 2359.8 2328.6 2854.1 3165.2 3109.5 2658.9 2095.4 2362.1 2558.3 2981.4 2352.8
No. of
obs  
21 21 21 21 21 93 93 93 93 93 53 53 53 53 53
This table reports the estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the NSI index per ECB governors’ eras. LL stands for log likelihood. Figures in brackets denote 
p-values. a: p≤0.01, b:p≤0.05, c:p≤0.10.
42
Table 7. EGARCH-X estimates: Sentiment Index (crisis period: 2007 - 2009)
Variables/ S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKKEI



































































































































No. of obs.  30 30 30 30 30
This table reports the estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the SI index and during the
financial crisis period. LL stands for log likelihood. Figures in brackets denote p-values. a: p≤0.01,
b:p≤0.05, c:p≤0.10.
Table 8. EGARCH-X estimates: Net Sentiment Index (crisis period: 2007 - 2009)
Variables/ S&P500 CAC40 FTSE100 DAX NIKKEI




































































































































No. of obs. 30 30 30 30 30
This table reports the estimates of the equations (1) and (2) for the case of the NSI index and during the
financial crisis period. LL stands for log likelihood. Figures in brackets denote p-values. a: p≤0.01,
b:p≤0.05, c:p≤0.10.
